We show that the most cost-efficient subset problem for linear programming games is NP-hard, and in fact inapproximable within a constant factor in polynomial time, unless P = NP. This in turn implies that computing the prices output by an egalitarian mechanism and computing a cost allocation in the equal split-off set for linear programming games is NP-hard.
Introduction
In a cost sharing problem, there is a set of players and a provider. Each player would like to receive service from the provider, and has its own private valuation for receiving this service. In order to determine which players to serve, the provider solicits bids from the players. Considering both the players' bids and the costs of serving the players, the provider determines which players to serve, and the price it charges each player for service. In other words, the service provider determines how the cost of service is shared between the players. Based on this determination, each player receives some utility. The algorithm that the provider uses to determine the set of players served and the prices to charge these players is called a cost sharing mechanism.
There has been a considerable amount of research on cost sharing mechanisms, focused primarily on those that satisfy or approximately satisfy various desirable properties. These include (i) truthfulness, the idea that individual players or groups of players are incentivized to truthfully bid their private valuations, (ii) budget balance, the notion that the prices recover the cost of providing service, and (iii) economic efficiency, the idea that the welfare of the players is maximized. In addition, computational complexity is also often considered in the design of a cost sharing mechanism: it is usually desirable to design a mechanism that runs quickly (e.g. in polynomial time).
Various notions of truthfulness have been used in cost sharing mechanism design. One such notion is strategyproofness: a mechanism is strategyproof if no single player can improve its utility by bidding a value other than its own valuation. Some stronger notions that consider bidding by groups of players have also been used, such as group strategyproofness, group strategyproofness against service-aware players, and weak group strategyproofness (the last being weaker than the first two).
In lieu of measuring economic efficiency using the traditional social welfare objective, much recent work has adopted the social cost objective [21] . In light of existing impossibility results involving the social welfare objective [9, 11] , Roughgarden and Sundararajan [21] demonstrated that studying the approximability of social cost instead allows for a finer distinction when comparing mechanisms on the basis of economic efficiency.
Researchers have introduced and studied various frameworks for cost sharing mechanisms with differing trade-offs between budget balance, economic efficiency, and truthfulness. Moulin [18] and Moulin and Shenker [19] proposed a class of cost sharing mechanisms, now known as Moulin mechanisms, that use cross-monotonic cost sharing methods to simulate an iterative ascending auction among the players. These mechanisms are approximately budget balanced, depending on the underlying cost sharing method used, and group strategyproof. Roughgarden and Sundararajan [21] introduced the notion of summable cost sharing methods, and proved that summability characterizes efficiency with respect to social cost for Moulin mechanisms. Mehta et al. [17] proposed a generalization of Moulin mechanisms called acyclic mechanisms and showed that these mechanisms are weakly group strategyproof. Bleischwitz et al. [2] introduced egalitarian mechanisms, inspired by the work of Dutta and Ray [8] , and showed that these mechanisms are budget balanced, approximately efficient, and group strategyproof against service-aware players.
As one might expect, the efficacy of a cost sharing mechanism strongly depends on the cost of serving the players. In particular, the provider must consider, either implicitly or explicitly, the cost to serve every subset of players. These costs can be represented as a cooperative game. Many researchers have focused on the using the frameworks above to design cost sharing mechanisms for cooperative games arising from specific optimization problems [e.g. 4, 12, 16, 25] . Georgiou and Swamy [10] showed how to design cost sharing mechanisms for a class of cooperative games whose costs can be well-approximated by linear programming relaxations of a certain form. The resulting mechanisms are strategyproof, approximately efficient, and charge prices that recover the service cost incurred.
In this work, we focus on a particular class of cooperative games: linear programming games [20] .
A linear programming game is a cooperative game in which the cost for each subset of players is given implicitly as the optimal value of an underlying linear program whose constraints depend in a structured way on the subset of players. Several authors have shown that various cooperative games, especially those arising from network optimization problems, can be seen as linear programming games. These include assignment games [22] , maximum flow games [14, 15] , location games [24] , and network synthesis games [23] , which include minimum cost spanning tree games [5] as a special case.
In particular, we examine the computational complexity of egalitarian mechanisms for linear programming games. Although it turns out that egalitarian mechanisms are essentially best possible for linear programming games among strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms with respect to budget balance and economic efficiency, we show that egalitarian mechanisms are NP-hard to compute.
In particular, we show that a key subroutine in egalitarian mechanisms is inapproximable within a constant factor, unless P = NP. The construction used in the proof of this result implies that computing the prices output by egalitarian mechanisms is NP-hard. This construction also has implications on the computational complexity of the equal split-off set [3] of linear programming games.
Preliminaries

Linear programming games
A transferable utility cooperative game is a pair (N, c) , where N represents a finite set of players, and c : 2 N → R defines the cost associated with each coalition, or subset of players. A linear programming game [20] is a cooperative game (N, c) in which the cost c(S) associated with coalition S ∈ 2 N is the optimal value of the following linear program:
with objective function vector f ∈ R s , constraint matrix A ∈ R r×s , and requirement vectors d i ∈ R r for each player i ∈ N . We assume that f , A, and d i for all i ∈ N are given so that c is nondecreasing, and LP S has a finite optimal value for every coalition S ∈ 2 N . For example, these assumptions are satisfied when f ≥ 0, A ≥ 0, and d i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N (however, note that this is not a necessary condition). Note that linear programming games are subadditive: that is, for any linear programming
Cost sharing mechanisms
Mathematically speaking, a cost sharing problem can be described as follows. There is a set of players N interested in receiving a service, and a cost function c that defines the cost of providing service to every subset of players. In other words, (N, c) is a cooperative game. Note that service is binary: a player either receives or does not receive service. Each player i ∈ N has a private valuation v i for receiving service; that is, v i is the most that player i is willing to pay for the service.
In addition, each player i ∈ N announces a bid b i , a public broadcast of the amount it is willing to pay for the service, which may or may not be different from its true valuation v i . A cost sharing mechanism is an algorithm that takes the cooperative game (N, c) and the players' bids b i for all i ∈ N as input, and outputs (i) a set of players S to be served, and (ii) prices p i that each player i ∈ N will pay. The pair (S, p) is called an outcome of a cost sharing mechanism. Note that strictly speaking, S and p are functions of the cooperative game (N, c) and bids b i for all i ∈ N .
Cost sharing mechanisms are typically designed to satisfy the following standard assumptions:
(i) individual rationality, that is, for any outcome (S, p), p i ≤ b i for all i ∈ S, and p i = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S; and (ii) no positive transfers, that is, for any outcome (S, p), p i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . In addition, we make the common assumption that players maximize quasilinear utilities: that is, the utility u i (S, p) of player i with outcome (S, p) is v i δ i − p i , where
One goal in designing a cost sharing mechanism is to ensure that it is truthful : that is, to make sure that both individual players as well as groups of players are incentivized to bid their true valuations. There are various notions of truthfulness. The most basic is strategyproofness: a mechanism is strategyproof if no single player can increase its utility by false bidding (bidding a value other than its valuation), when all other bids are kept fixed. Group strategyproofness takes this idea one step further: a mechanism is group strategyproof if false bidding by any coalition that increases the utility of one of its members also decreases the utility of another one of its members, when all other bids are fixed. A mechanism is group strategyproof against service-aware players [2] if it is group strategyproof with respect to modified utility functions in which a player strictly prefers being served at a price equal to its valuation over not being served at all. Other notions of truthfulness that have been studied in the literature include weak group strategyproofness [6] , and weak group strategyproofness against service-aware players [2] .
One important property of a cost sharing mechanism is whether it recovers or approximately recovers the cost of service. For any β ∈ [0, 1], we say that a cost sharing mechanism is β-budget- In other words, the cost sharing mechanism always recovers at least a fraction β of the cost of service. We sometimes refer to β as a mechanism's budget balance guarantee.
Another important property of a cost sharing mechanism is whether it outputs an outcome that is economically efficient. Much of the recent literature on cost sharing mechanisms uses social cost [21] as a measure of economic efficiency. The social cost of an outcome (S, p) of a cost sharing mechanism is defined as c(S) + i∈N \S v i . For any α ≥ 1, a cost sharing mechanism is α-efficient if
for any outcome (S, p) of the mechanism. We sometimes refer to α as a mechanism's efficiency guarantee.
Egalitarian mechanisms [2] were inspired by an algorithmic idea for egalitarian allocations in convex cooperative games originally proposed by Dutta and Ray [8] . Roughly speaking, at every iteration, an egalitarian mechanism finds the most "cost efficient" subset of players that have not yet been assigned a price, and assigns each of these players their collective average marginal cost as its price.
Formally, we can describe an egalitarian mechanism as follows. For a cooperative game (N, c) and coalition S ∈ 2 N , we define the function
The most cost-efficient subset problem for a cooperative game (N, c) with respect to R ⊆ N and
Algorithm 3.1 describes the egalitarian mechanism for a cooperative game (N, c).
Algorithm 3.1 (Egalitarian mechanism).
Input: cooperative game (N, c); bid vector b ∈ R n Output: set of served players S ∈ 2 N ; prices p ∈ R n
end if 11 end while Bleischwitz et al. [2] showed that egalitarian mechanisms are group strategyproof against service-aware players, 1-budget-balanced, and if the cost function c is nonnegative and subadditive, 2H n -efficient. This result holds for linear programming games, since these games are nonnegative and subadditive. It turns out that these are essentially best possible budget balance and efficiency guarantees for linear programming games: Dobzinski et al. [7] showed that any O(1)-budget-balanced strategyproof cost sharing mechanism for publicly excludable games is Ω(log n)-efficient. A publicly excludable game is a cooperative game (N, c) with c(S) = 1 for all S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, and c(∅) = 0. It is straightforward to see that linear programming games include publicly excludable games.
Lemma 3.2.
A publicly excludable game is a special case of a linear programming game.
Proof. Consider the following linear programming game (N, c) with n = r and s = 1. The objective function vector, constraint matrix and requirement vectors are
where 1 n ∈ R n is a vector of ones, and 1 n(i) ∈ R n is the ith elementary unit vector in R n . It follows that c(∅) = 0 and c(S) = 1 for any coalition S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}.
On the other hand, we show that egalitarian mechanisms for linear programming games have high computational complexity: unfortunately, it turns out that the most cost-efficient subset problem for linear programming games is NP-hard, and in fact inapproximable within a constant factor in polynomial time, unless P = NP. The proof of this result also implies that computing the prices output by egalitarian mechanisms for linear programming games is NP-hard.
Remarks. Bleischwitz et al. [2] actually defined egalitarian mechanisms as a class of cost sharing mechanisms that includes the one described in Algorithm 3.1. In particular, they allowed for a more general way of computing the subset T * in line 3 and the associated price a in line 4. However, the budget balance and efficiency guarantees mentioned above were shown specifically for the mechanism described in Algorithm 3.1.
Georgiou and Swamy [10] gave a different cost sharing mechanism that is strategyproof, O(log n)-efficient, and charges prices that recover the cost incurred, for any cooperative game (N, c) with nondecreasing cost function c. This mechanism is not necessarily 1-budget-balanced, because the total prices charged are not bounded above.
Theorem 3.3. The most cost-efficient subset problem for linear programming games is NP-hard.
In addition, there is no ρ-approximation algorithm for the most cost-efficient subset problem for linear programming games, for any ρ ∈ O(n 1/2−ε ) and ε > 0, unless P = NP.
Proof. We show that any instance of the maximum cardinality set packing problem can be reduced to an instance of the most cost-efficient subset problem for linear programming games. Roughly speaking, we construct a linear programming game in which the players are divided into two sets:
"real" players who correspond to the family of subsets given in the set packing problem, and "dummy"
players. The underlying linear programs are constructed so that the difference between the cost for a coalition that consists of both "real" and "dummy" players and the cost for a coalition that consists of only "dummy" players is small when the "real" players correspond to a set packing, and large otherwise. As a consequence, an approximation algorithm for the most cost-efficient subset problem can take advantage of this gap to find an approximately maximum cardinality set packing.
Consider an arbitrary instance of the maximum cardinality set packing problem, with a collection C = {C 1 , . . . , C m } of nonempty subsets of {1, . . . , q}. Recall that the objective of this problem is to find a packing -a subset T ⊆ {1, . . . , m} such that max j=1,...,q |{i ∈ T : j ∈ C i }| ≤ 1 -of maximum cardinality. Without loss of generality, we assume that m ≥ 2.
From this instance of the maximum cardinality set packing problem, we construct the following linear programming game with n = m + + 1 players, for some ∈ Z >0 . For any k ∈ Z >0 , let 1 k ∈ R k denote a vector of ones, 0 k ∈ R k denote a vector of zeros, and 1 k(i) ∈ R k denote the ith elementary unit vector in R k . In addition, for each i = 1, . . . , m, let 1 C i ∈ R q denote the indicator vector for C i . The dimensions of f , A and d i for each i ∈ N are given by r = q + m + + 1 and s = 3. We define f , A, and d i for each i ∈ N as follows:
Note that i∈T 1
By definition, π(T ) ≤ 1 if and only if T is a packing. Since C 1 , . . . , C m are nonempty, π(T ) ≥ 1 for any T = ∅.
We evaluate c for different coalitions. First, note that c(∅) = 0. For all T ⊆ {1, . . . , m} such that T = ∅, we have that
For all S ⊆ {m + 1, . . . , m + } such that S = ∅, we have that
Finally, for all T ⊆ {1, . . . , m} and S ⊆ {m + 1, . . . , m + } such that S, T = ∅, we have that
Since π(T ) ≥ 1 for all T = ∅ and π is nondecreasing, it follows that c is nondecreasing.
Note that the objective function of the most cost-efficient subset problem for (N, c) with respect to R = N and S = {m + 1, . . . , m + + 1} is
. . , m} such that T = ∅. It follows that for any T = ∅,
T is a packing, and Fix some ε > 0. Suppose we run the egalitarian mechanism with input (N, c) and bids b i = 1 + ε for all i ∈ N . In the first iteration, the mechanism computes min T ⊆N :T =∅ g ∅ (T ). Recall that g ∅ (T ) = c(T )/|T |. For any T ⊆ {1, . . . , m} such that T = ∅, we have that
In addition, for any T ⊆ {m + 1, . . . , m + m 3 + 1} such that T = ∅, we have that
and this holds with equality only when T = {m + 1, . . . , m + m 3 + 1}. Finally, for any T = T 1 ∪ T 2 such that T 1 ⊆ {1, . . . , m}, T 2 ⊆ {m + 1, . . . , m + m 3 + 1}, and T 1 , T 2 = ∅, we have that Note that m 2 /(m 3 + 1) < 1/m. Since prices throughout the execution of the egalitarian mechanism are nondecreasing, it follows that in any set of prices output by the egalitarian mechanism with input (N, c) and bids b i = 1 + ε for all i ∈ N , the second smallest non-zero price allocated to any player is equal to the optimal value of min T ⊆N \S:T =∅ g S (T ), which was shown to be NP-hard to compute in the proof of Theorem 3.3.
The most cost-efficient subset problem has also been used to define solution concepts in cooperative game theory. The equal split-off set [3] of a subadditive cooperative game (N, c) is the set of all cost allocations that can be computed by the following algorithm, again, inspired by the algorithm of Dutta and Ray [8] . (Note that Branzei et al. [3] define the equal split-off set for superadditive reward cooperative games. Here, we look at the natural equivalent for cost cooperative games.) 
Concluding remarks
One natural research direction extending from this work to investigate whether a variant of an egalitarian mechanism for linear programming games can be computed in polynomial time, perhaps by relaxing its budget balance or efficiency guarantees. Bleischwitz et al. [2] proposed a framework for designing approximately budget-balanced and economically efficient egalitarian mechanisms, and applied this framework to various scheduling and bin packing cooperative games. Their framework relies on a notion of size for each player, so that the players can be sequenced according to their size. This is natural in scheduling and bin packing contexts, in which each player has a job or item of a particular length. For linear programming games, however, it is not immediately clear what might constitute a good sequence of players.
On a related note, it turns out that the techniques of Georgiou and Swamy [10] can be adapted to construct a cost sharing mechanism for linear programming games with d i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N that is strategyproof, O(log n)-efficient, charges prices that recover the cost incurred, and runs in polynomial time.
